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Articles
FOR THE PETITIONER
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
with Kathryn Grill Graeff, Assistant Attorney General
Do police officers have the authority, during a
traffic stop, to order the passengers to exit the
vehicle? This question implicates the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and it involves the weighing
of the liberty and privacy interests of persons
traveling on the public roadways against the safety
of police officers who conduct thousands of traffic
stops every day. Courts throughout the nation were
divided on the answer to this question. On
February 19, 1997, the Supreme Court resolved the
controversy; it held that a police officer making a
traffic stop may, as a matter of course, order the
passengers to get out of the car pending completion
of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882,
886 (1997).
The case started on June 8, 1994, when a
Maryland State Trooper observed a car speeding
on Interstate 95 in Baltimore County, with what
appeared to be suspicious license plate tags. The
officer activated his cruiser's lights and siren, but
the driver continued driving for approximately one
and one-half miles before finally stopping. During
the pursuit, the officer observed that the two
passengers in the car turned and looked at the
officer several times, repeatedly ducking below the
seat level and then reappearing.
Once the car stopped, the officer continued to
see a lot of movement in the car, which made him
hesitant to approach it. The officer, who was alone
in his cruiser, got out and saw that the driver of the
vehicle had already exited the car. The officer
directed the driver to step back toward him, and the
officer met the driver between their vehicles. The
driver, who was unusually nervous, produced a
valid Connecticut driver's license and stated that
the rental papers were in the car.
The officer told the driver to retrieve the rental
papers, and the driver went back to the car. The
officer observed that the front seat passenger, Jerry
Lee Wilson, was sweating and extremely nervous.
Because the officer was concerned for his safety,
he asked Wilson to get out of the car and step
toward him. After initially refusing to comply with
this request, Wilson opened the door and took one
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step out, whereupon crack cocaine dropped to the
ground.
Wilson was indicted on charges of
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute,
as well as related offenses. Prior to trial in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Wilson moved to
suppress the cocaine, arguing that the officer had
violated Wilson's Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures by ordering him to step
out of the car. The circuit court agreed, ruling that
an officer could not order a passenger out of a car
without reasonable articulable suspicion that the
passenger was involved in criminal activity, and that
there was no such suspicion in this case.
Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that the exit
order was an unlawful seizure and the evidence of
cocaine should be suppressed.
The State of Maryland appealed the trial
court's suppression order to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. The State argued that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures, the seizure in this case was
not unreasonable. Initially, the State argued that it
was reasonable for an officer making a traffic stop
to order a passenger out of the vehicle without any
suspicion that the .passenger was involved in
criminal activity. The ultimate test of whether the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures has been violated is
reasonableness, and reasonableness "is judged by
balancing [the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
The State noted that, twenty years ago, in
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the
Supreme Court had applied this balancing test to
hold that an officer conducting a traffic stop could
order the driver to exit the vehicle without any
particularized suspicion that the driver had
committed any wrongdoing independent of the
traffic stop. The Supreme Court balanced the
driver's privacy and liberty interests against the
State's interest in protecting its police officers
during potentially dangerous traffic stops. Id. at
110-11. The Court concluded that the State's
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interest in the safety of its officers far outweighed
the driver's interest in not routinely being made to
step out of the car after it had been stopped for a
traffic violation. Id. at 111. The Court stated that
"[w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience cannot
prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns
for the officer's safety." Id.
The State argued that the Mimms analysis
applied to any occupant of a vehicle stopped for a
traffic violation. A passenger presents as significant
a danger to the safety of the police officer as the
driver and, indeed, the potential danger to an officer
increases with the number of occupants in a car.
Accordingly, the State argued, it was reasonable for
an officer to automatically order the passenger to
exit the vehicle during a traffic stop.
The State made the alternate argument that,
even if suspicion of criminal, activity was necessary
to authorize a police officer to order a passenger
out of a car, the officer had the requisite suspicion
here. We argued that the extreme nervousness of
Wilson and the driver, along with the furtive
movements of the passengers and that the vehicle
did not pull over for one and one-half miles after
being pursued with flashing lights and sirens, gave
the officer reasonable suspicion to believe that the
occupants of the vehicle were, or had been,
involved in a crime. Accordingly, we asked the
court of special appeals to reverse the circuit court's
suppression order.
The court of special appeals rejected the
State's argument that the officer had reasonable
suspicion to believe that the passenger was
involved in criminal activity. Maryland v. Wilson,
106 Md. App. 24, 28-31 (1995). With respect to the
argument that a police officer has the automatic
right to order a passenger to exit the vehicle, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recognized
that some states had adopted this position. Id. at
46-47. It believed, however, that the result of the
balancing process was different for a passenger
than it was for a driver, suggesting that the "cost" of
the exit order was higher for the passenger
because the passenger had not committed the
traffic violation that resulted in the vehicle's stop.
Id. at 42-43. Accordingly, the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the lower court's suppression
order, holding that it was reasonable for a police
officer to order a passenger out of the vehicle only

when the officer had some suspicion of danger. Id.
at 48.
The State then filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, asking the Court of Appeals of Maryland
to hear the case. On November 22, 1995, the
Court of Appeals denied the State's petition.
The State then had to decide whether to take
the issue to the United States Supreme Court.
Over 6,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari are filed,'
in the United States Supreme Court ,every year,
and, in recent terms, the Supreme Court has
granted review in fewer than 100 cases., 66
U.S.L.W. 3136 (August 12, 1997). Thus, it takes
more than an interesting issue to prompt the
Supreme Court to decide to hear a case, and the
State wanted to do everything possible to increase
the odds that the Supreme Court would grant our
petition in this case. Knowing that one factor that
weighs heavily in the Supreme Court's decision to
hear a case is whether there is a split of authority in
the United States, we researched the law in all the
states and federal districts. There was a definite
split of authority on the issue of whether a police
officer could automatically order a passenger to exit
a vehicle during a traffic stop. Twenty states,l and
five federal courts,2 were of the view that an officer
, State v. Webster, 824 P.2d 768. 770 (Ariz. 1991); People v. Melgosa,
753 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo. 1988); State v. Dukes, 547 A,2d 10, 22
(Conn. 1988); Thomas v. United States, 553 A,2d 1206, 1207 n.7 (D.C.
1989); Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 596 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1992); People v.
Salvator, 602 N.E.2d 953, 963 (III. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 610
N.E,2d 1273 (III. 1993); WarT v. State, 580 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991); State v. Landry, 588 So, 2d 345, 347 (La. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Pappalardo, 10 Mass. App. 409 N.E.2d 815, 816
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Martinez, 466 N.w.2d 380, 384 n.5
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 483 N.W.2d 868
(Mich. 1992); State v. Ferrise, 269 N.w.2d 888, 890-91 (Minn. 1978);
State v. Reynolds, 753 S.w.2d 1, 2 (Mo. App. 1988); People v.
Robinson, 543 N,E.2d 733,733-34 (N,Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S,
966 (1989); State v. Collins, 248 S.E.2d 405, 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978);
State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W,2d 93,96 (N,D, 1993); State v. Williams,
641 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), dismissed, 639 N.E.2d 114
(Ohio 1994); Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A,2d 1096, 1102 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 664 A,2d 972 (Pa. 1995); State v.
Soares, 648 A.2d 804, 806 (R.1. 1994); Graham v. State, 893 S.W.2d
4,7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Bethea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 419
S.E.2d 249, 250-52 (Va. App. 1992) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds,
429 S.E.2d 211 (Va, 1993); State v. Richardson, 456 N.W.2d 830, 836
(Wis. 1990).
Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir.
S. Ct. 1841 (1996); United States v. Hill, 60
1995.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 432 (1995);
929 F.2d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991); United States V. Sanders, 631
Ruvalcaba v. City of
1995), cert. denied, 116
F.3d 672, 682 (10th Cir
United States v. Powell,

2
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did have this automatic authority, whereas five
states3 took the position that an officer must have
some level of suspicion to issue an exit order.
Once we found this split of authority, there
were tactical decisions to make. For example, we
had to decide whether to raise the issue of
reasonable suspicion to order the passenger to exit
the vehicle.
Although we believed that the
nervousness, the furtive movements, and the initial
failure to stop gave the officer reasonable suspicion
to believe the occupants of the vehicle were
involved in criminal activity, we decided not to
include this issue in our petition for a writ of
certiorari. The issue of whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion to justify a Fourth Amendment
seizure involved a routine application of the facts to
a well-established principle of law and was unlikely
to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Including
this issue might detract from the other issue, not yet
decided by the Supreme Court, whether the police
had the automatic right to order passengers to exit
the vehicle. Accordingly, we decided to confine our
petition to this one novel issue.
The State also sought amicus support for its
argument. That other states or organizations are
willing to take the time to write an amicus brief
signals to the Court the importance of the issue
involved. Indeed, statistics compiled indicate that
of the state petitions for a writ of certiorari filed in
the United States Supreme Court that are filed with
amicus support, fifty percent are granted. Supreme
Court Report (National Association of Attorneys
General, Washington, D.C.), October 10, 1997, at
2. Thus, having amicus support may increase the
chances that a petition will be granted.
The National Association for Attorneys
General sent notice to the Office of the Attorney
General in every state, setting forth the issue to be
presented to the Supreme Court and asking if any
state was interested in providing amicus support.
The Ohio Attorney General's Office ultimately
F.2d 1309, 1312 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981); United States v. McCoy, 824 F. Supp. 467, 474 (D. Del. 1993).
People v. Maxwell, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 1008-09, 254 Cal. Rptr.
124, 126-27 (1988); State v. Becker, 458 NW.2d 604, 607 (Iowa
1990); State v. Wilson, 664 A.2d 1, 12 (Md. App. 1995), cert. denied,
667 A.2d 342 (Md. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997); State v. Smith,
637 A.2d 158, 166 (N.J. 1994); Johnson v. State, 601 SW.2d 326,
328-29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
3

28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 14

agreed to write an amicus curiae ("friend of the
court") brief in support of Maryland's petition, and
twenty-five states and the Virgin Islands joined
Ohio's amicus brief.
After we filed our petition for a writ of certiorari,
we became aware that this same issue was
pending before the Supreme Court in another case.
In Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323
(9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit, in a civil rights
case, had taken a different position from the one
taken by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
and held that a police officer could order a
passenger out of the vehicle without any
reasonable suspicion. That case was scheduled to
be conferenced by the Supreme Court shortly
before Maryland's petition was set to be
conferenced. When the Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari in Ruvalcaba, it was
unclear what import that decision had on
Maryland's case. We had the answer several
weeks later. On June 17, 1996, however, the
Supreme Court granted Maryland's petition for a
writ of certiorari. We had forty five days to write our
brief, file an appendix with pertinent lower court
proceedings, and coordinate amicus briefs.
The team of lawyers that had been involved in
the petition for a writ of certiorari began work on the
brief. This team consisted of the authors of this
article: Gary Bair, Chief of the Criminal Appeals
Division, and Mary Ellen Barbera, Deputy Chief of
the Criminal Appeals Division.
We poured through Supreme Court
jurisprudence, including all decisions dealing with
the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the applicable balancing
analysis.
The first component was the
gove"rnmental interest to be served by allowing
officers to automatically order passengers from the
vehicle during a traffic stop. We culled through the
decisions holding that officer safety is a compelling
governmental interest, see Maryland v. Buie, 494
U.S. 325, 333-34 (1990); New York v. Class, 475
U.S. 106, 116 (1986); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U. S. at 110-11, and recognizing that traffic stops
are particularly dangerous to police officers, see
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); New
York v. Class, 475 U.S. at 116-17; Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978). We noted that
the danger inherent in roadside encounters only
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increases when passengers are present.
Passengers, like drivers, are likely to have access
to weapons that may be inside the passenger area
of a car. Moreover, the passenger could act with
the driver or other passengers to attack the officer,
or ambush the officer while he or she is dealing with
the driver.
We compiled statistics from the Department of
Justice showing that over five thousand police
officers are assaulted each year during the course
of traffic stops. We also visited the scene of the
crime to get a better idea of what an officer faces.
The traffic stop in this case occurred on a busy
highway, Interstate 95, in Baltimore County. As we
sat on the shoulder of the highway, with the cars
speeding by, it became much more apparent how
necessary it was for an officer to be able take
control of the traffic stop.
We then looked at the other side of the
balancing equation - the intrusion on the passenger.
We compiled Supreme Court cases detailing that
there was a lesser expectation of privacy in a
vehicle due to the public nature of automobile travel
and the pervasive governmental regulations on
automobile travel. See New York v. Class, 475
U.S. at 113; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 368 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 441 (1973). Because people who travel on the
public roadways are subject to being stopped by a
governmental agent at sobriety checkpoints, toll
booths, or for traffic violations, passengers, like
drivers, enjoy only minimal privacy and liberty
interests.
In addition to the decreased expectation of
privacy in the car, the intrusion at issue here was
minimal. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Supreme
Court described the intrusion of asking the driver to
step out of the vehicle as "de minimis" and "a mere
inconvenience." 434 U.S. at 111. The order to the
passenger to step out of the vehicle is similarly an
inconsequential intrusion.
We anticipated that Wilson would argue, as
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals had found,
that the analysis was different for the passenger
because the passenger, as opposed to the driver,
had committed no wrongdoing. We wanted to
counter that argument by pointing to other
instances where the police have the authority to
control the movements of people without any

suspicion of wrongdoing. We noted that the police
interfere with the movement of people when they
evacuate a building in response to a bomb threat,
secure a crime scene, or reroute traffic around a
parade or traffic accident. Thus, the fact that the
police had no knowledge that the passenger had
done anything wrong did not make the seizure
unreasonable.
In addition to assessing the legal arguments,
we had to consider the practical effect this case
would have on police officers. Although the officer
in this case testified that he ordered the passenger
out of the vehicle for his safety, we recognized that,
in some instances, it might be safer for the officer to
order all the passengers to remain in the car while
the officer completed the traffic stop. We spoke
with police officers throughout the State regarding
how officers are trained to respond to a traffic stop.
As it turned out, police officers are typically trained
to order all occupants, drivers and passengers
alike, to remain seated inside the vehicle while the
police officer completes the traffic stop.
We wondered if this general police policy to
keep passengers in the vehicle would weaken our
position that it was reasonable automatically to
order a passenger to exit the vehicle. We were
told, however, that, although the general policy is to
keep passengers in the vehicle, the officer
ultimately is taught to control the risk during a traffic
stop. The officer attending the traffic stop is the
only one who can assess, under the circumstances
of that particular stop, whether it is safer to keep the
passengers in the car or to order them out of the
car where the officer can better see if they have any
weapons. Thus, the State's position was that if an
officer felt it was safer to ask the passenger to exit
the vehicle while he or she completed the traffic
stop, this was reasonable conduct under the Fourth
Amendment.
Although our case involved only an exit order,
we decided to propose a rule that would cover both
an exit order and an order to remain in the vehicle.
Such a rule would cover this case, as well as the
typical police practice, and another decision that
had recently been issued by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, Dennis v. State, 674 A.2d 928 (Md.
1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 40 (1996).
In Dennis, a police officer ordered the
passenger to stay in the vehicle and the passenger
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refused. The passenger got out of the car and
started to walk away. The officer again told the
passenger to stay with the vehicle, and when the
passenger refused to comply, the officer forcibly
stopped the passenger. A struggle ensued, and the
passenger was ultimately charged with disorderly
conduct and battery. Id. at 199. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland reversed the convictions,
holding that the officer did not have the legal right to
order the passenger to remain in the vehicle and
Dennis, therefore, had the right to resist the
ensuing unlawful arrest. Id. at 211-12.
Maryland was filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Dennis case as well,4 and we
decided to propose a rule in this case that would
allow both types of orders, an order to the
passenger to exit the vehicle or an order to stay in
the vehicle, whichever the police officer thought
was the best way to safely complete the traffic stop.
Accordingly, the State proposed a rule that would
allow the police to take limited steps to control the
movements of the passengers during the brief time
it took to complete the traffic stop.
Argument was set for December 11, 1996.
Each side would get thirty minutes to argue its
position. For Petitioner, the State of Maryland
would have twenty minutes and the United States,
as amicus, would get ten minutes. J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., Maryland's Attorney General, would be
arguing for the State of Maryland, his second
argument before the United States Supreme Court.
Janet Reno, the United States Attorney General,
would be arguing for the United States, her first
argument before the Court.
Although the brief had already been written,
there was much to be done. Cases were read and
reread. Numerous hypotheticals were devised.
Although our rule seemed simple, the police could
take limited steps to control the movements of all
4 The Supreme Court subsequently granted Maryland's petition and
vacated the Court of Appeals' decision in Dennis, remanding for the
Court of Appeals to reconsider the case in light of another Supreme
Court case, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). Mary/and
v. Dennis, 117 S. Ct. 40 (1996). In Whren, the Supreme Court held
that police conduct is viewed objectively for Fourth Amendment
purposes, and an officer's subjective intent will not make otherwise
lawful conduct illegal under the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 1774. On
remand, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed its initial decision,
Dennis v. State, 345 Md. 654 (1997), and the Supreme Court denied
the State's petition for a writ of certiorari, Mary/and v. Dennis, 118 S.
Ct. 329 (1997).
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occupants of the vehicle during the time it took to
complete the traffic stop, the boundaries of these
limited steps were not so clear. Although our case
involved nothing more than the exit order, we
needed to be prepared to explain exactly how f~r
our proposed rule would go. We ultimately decided
to ask for a rule that allowed an officer to order a
passenger to get out of the vehicle, show his hands,
and remain at the scene until the officer completed
the traffic stop. Although further actions might be
reasonable in certain circumstances, even without
any suspicion of wrongdoing, it was Maryland's
position that it was always reasonable to order the
passenger to exit, to show his hands and to remain
at the scene during the traffic stop.
We set up a schedule of moot courts, tapping
lawyers with expertise in the Fourth Amendment
and experience arguing in the Supreme Court.
Each moot court presented new "worst case"
scenarios. Was it reasonable to order a passenger
to exit the vehicle if the passenger was disabled?
If the passenger was a young child? If it was
pouring rain and the passenger was on her way to
the prom?
Our response to each of these
scenarios was the same: we expect our police
officers to use their judgment in responding to a
traffic stop, and a police officer probably would not
require a passenger to exit in those circumstances.
If an officer did issue an exit order under those
circumstances, there might be administrative
sanctions, but it would not constitute a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to reviewing the case law, devising
hypotheticals and engaging in moot courts, we took
other steps to prepare for the argument. We
attended a Supreme Court argument in Ohio v.
Robinette, another traffic stop case. We thought
the Supreme Court's questioning might give us
insight on the Justices' thoughts regarding police
power during traffic stops. We also met with Janet
Reno and the Solicitor General's office to discuss
our strategy during the argument.
The day of argument finally arrived. All of our
preparations paid off. The questioning was intense,
but we had answers, to the extent there were
answers, to all of the Justices' questions. However,
the court wanted more information in the area of
statistics. Although we ~ad provided statistics on
the numbers of officers assaulted and killed during
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traffic stops, the Justices wanted even more
specific information, i. e., how many of those attacks
occurred while the person was inside, as opposed
to outside, the vehicle. This information was not
readily available. Although the Justice Department
compiled statistics of the number of officers
assaulted and killed each year, the specificity of the
statistics was limited. The circumstances under
which the assaults and deaths occurred were
broken down into thirteen different categories, such
as robberies, domestic disputes, bar fights and
. traffic stops, but there was no further breakdown of
the particular' circumstances involved in each
category.5 There was no question, however, that
traffic stops present a real danger to police officers.
The Court seemed to accept our proposition
that, in other instances, the police are permitted to
control the movements of innocent persons. The
Court indicated that a police officer is permitted to
tell bystanders at a crime or arrest scene to stay
back, and it suggested that allowing the officer to
order the passenger to get out of the vehicle would
not give the officer any greater authority than the
officer has in the case of a public arrest.
The area with which the Court showed the
most concern was our position that the officer had
the authority, after issuing the exit order, to order
the passenger to remain at the scene during the
time it took to complete the traffic stop. Although a
holding that an officer cbuld detain a passenger
after an exit order was not necessary to our case,
since the cocaine fell from Wilson's pants as he
was exiting the car, such a ruling was, in our view,
the logical next step. Since the rationale for
allowing the police to issue an exit order to
passengers is to protect officers, it would be logical
to allow the officer to require the passengers to
remain where the officer can see the passengers,
rather than allow the passengers to leave the
scene, hide behind a tree or a bush and then
ambush the officer as he or she deals with the
driver. The State's view was that the officer must
be able to control the movements of the occupants
to safely effectuate the stop. The officer could not
automatically arrest or search the passengers, but

he or she should have the authority, if desired, to
take the limited step of asking the passenger to
remain at the scene during the brief time it takes to
complete the traffic stop.
At the end of the argument, it was unclear how
the Court would rule. On February 19, 1997, the
Supreme Court issued its opinion. The Court
agreed with the State's argument that, with respect
to the government interest involved, the danger
facing an officer during a traffic stop is likely to be
greater when there are passengers in addition to
the driver in the car. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct.
at 885.
On the other side of the balancing
equation, the Court held that the intrusion imposed
on the passenger, who has already been stopped
as a result of the traffic stop, is minimal. Id. at 886.
Accordingly, the Court held that a police officer
conducting a traffic stop may, as a matter of course,
order passengers to get out of the car pending
completion of the stop. Id.
An important step
was taken to protect the safety of police officers
who confront unknown dangers everyday. The
Court declined, however, to decide issues not
specifically presented by this case. The Court did
not decide whether, once the exit order had been
issued, the officer could order the passenger to
re~in at the scene until the traffic stop was
completed. Nor did the Court rule on the issue
whether police officers could order passengers to
remain in the vehicle during a traffic stop. Those
are issues for another day.

See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 1994, at 33 (1996).
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